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Abstract
Making a payment in a privacy-aware payment channel network is achieved by trying several payment paths
until one succeeds. With a large network, such as the Lightning Network, a completion of a single payment
can take up to several minutes. We introduce a network imbalance measure and formulate the optimization
problem of improving the balance of the network as a sequence of rebalancing operations of the funds within
the channels along circular paths within the network. As the funds and balances of channels are not globally
known, we introduce a greedy heuristic with which every node despite the uncertainty can improve its own local
balance. In an empirical simulation on a recent snapshot of the Lightning Network we demonstrate that the
imbalance distribution of the network has a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff distance of 0.74 in comparison to the imbalance
distribution after the heuristic is applied. We further show that the success rate of a single unit payment increases
from 11.2% on the imbalanced network to 98.3% in the balanced network. Similarly, the median possible payment
size across all pairs of participants increases from 0 to 0.5 mBTC for initial routing attempts on the cheapest
possible path. We provide an empirical evidence that routing fees should be dropped for proactive rebalancing
operations. Executing 4 different strategies for selecting rebalancing cycles lead to similar results indicating that
a collaborative approach within the friend of a friend network might be preferable from a practical point of view.
Keywords: Imbalance, rebalancing, Optimization, Bitcoin, Lightning Network, payment channel networks, path
finding, routing, liquidity, flow control, congestion control, game theory, uncertainty, simulations, collaborative
problem solving, privacy
1 Introduction
The Lightning Network has been introduced in or-
der to mitigate the scaling issues of blockchain tech-
nologies such as Bitcoin[9]. With the help of smart
contracts, a payment channel can be established to
allow the cryptographically secure transfer of value
without the necessity to record the transaction to
the central ledger. This yields enhanced privacy
properties for the participants of the network. In or-
der to protect that privacy while routing a payment
through several payment channels privacy aware pay-
ment channel networks use a source-based onion
routing scheme, like the Sphinx Mix format [2].
This prevents routing nodes from learning who paid
whom.
While the Lightning Network, for example, shares
the capacity of public channels with its participants
through its gossip protocol the local split of the ca-
pacity of the channels into the balance of its par-
ticipants is not shared with the rest of the net-
work for two reasons: (1) this would compromise
the privacy as one could collect all changes of the
channel balances and reconstruct the flow of pay-
ments; (2) propagating this information would es-
sentially mean that every node in the network is
made aware of every payment which would have
the same poor scaling properties as blockchain tech-
nologies and other broadcast networks. The deci-
sion to use source-based routing together with the
unknown channel balances of the network results
in a challenge for finding a path of payment chan-
nels so that all channels along the path have enough
liquidity to be able to forward an attempted pay-
ment. Currently, this challenge is met by probing
paths with a brute force approach until one such
path succeeds to route the payment. It has been
shown that probing for paths can take more than
3 minutes for more than 5% of the attempted pay-
ments [3]. This leads to a poor payment latency
and poor user experience. Imagine a grocery store
in which for every 20th customer the cash register
would have to wait three minutes until the payment
was received.
In this paper we examine the consequences of
nodes proactively and collaboratively distributing
their funds evenly across their channels. We intro-
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2 Related Work 2
duce the notation of an imbalanced network. The
imbalance is measured as the average of the imbal-
ance scores of its nodes. The node’s imbalance of
payment channels is defined as the Gini coefficient
of a node’s channel balance coefficients which are
the relative amount of funds a node owns in a chan-
nel in comparison to the capacity of that channel.
Note, nodes on both ends of the channel already
have all the information they need to compute their
imbalance. Nodes can reduce their imbalance ei-
ther by initiating a rebalancing their own channels
themselves, or, by collaboratively rebalancing the
channels with the help of their channel partners by
conducting circular payments. Another option is
to use a submarine swap1 as an off-chain/on-chain
swapping service.
We formulate an optimization problem of find-
ing a sequence of rebalancing operations that min-
imize the network’s imbalance. As the information
necessary to solve the optimization problem is not
publicly known in privacy-aware payment channel
networks, we provide a greedy heuristic for its par-
ticipants to find a minimum for the problem. In an
empirical study, we show that the greedy heuristic
will lead to a success rate of 98.3% for a small pay-
ment between two arbitrary selected nodes. Also
the median possible payment size between all pairs
of nodes increases from 0 in the imbalanced network
to 0.5 mBTC in the best balanced networks that we
found, when the cheapest possible path is selected
for the payment.
While single nodes can already execute the al-
gorithm in currently existing payment channel net-
works they have to pay routing fees for the rebal-
ancing operations. Thus economically, the fees dis-
incentivize the nodes to conduct rebalancing op-
erations. We compared the earned fees for being
participant of another nodes rebalancing attempt
and the paid fees for initiating rebalancing oper-
ations. Showing that these numbers are normally
distributed around 0 we propose to omit fees for
proactive rebalancing operations to incentivize nodes
to execute our algorithm which appears to be ben-
eficial for the entire network. Looking at different
strategies of finding rebalancing cycles we suggest,
for the sake of speed, that nodes share with their
neighbors on which local channels they would like
to have inbound or outbound capacity. This infor-
mation could easily be probed anyway and will not
to worsen the privacy of the nodes involved in re-
balancing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2 we give a short overview of re-
lated work in this field. We then introduce the no-
tation and definition of the imbalance score in Sec-
tion 3 and formulate the optimization problem to
reduce the imbalance. We propose a greedy and col-
1 https://github.com/submarineswaps/swaps-service
laborative algorithm in Section 3.1 to address the
optimization problem. We also propose different
strategies for the algorithm to probe for potential
rebalancing cycles. In Section 4 we introduce the
experimental setup and the data set that we used.
After showing our empirical results in Section 5 we
discuss the results, we propose extensions and fu-
ture work in the last two sections.
2 Related Work
While the Lightning Network white paper [9] does
not discuss path finding and states routing as an
easy problem it is generally recognized that pathfind-
ing on the Lightning Network is a difficult prob-
lem [6, 10, 1, 8, 4, 11]. There is already research
conducted in the field of rebalancing channels [5]
which was more about the cryptographic protocols
used to make sure that participants can enforce the
rebalancing that was agreed upon. There are rebal-
ancing operations for c-lightning2 and for lnd3. In
particular, the idea of just in time rebalancing while
fulfilling routing requests [7] has been implemented
as JIT-routing for c-lightning4.
3 Formalization and Assumptions
Let N = (V,E, c) be a payment channel network
with a finite set of nodes. The payment channels
are the edges in the network such that E ⊂ V ×
V . Additionally, we have a publicly known capacity
function c : E −→ N that assigns a capacity to every
edge of the network. For every edge e = (u, v) we
denote eu := (e, u) as the first participant of the
channel and ev = (e, v) as the second participant.
Naturally, the capacity of every channel e = (u, v)
is privately split into the local balances with the
balance function b : E × V −→ N such that b(eu) +
b(ev)
!
= c(e).
We define the channel balance coefficient for u
on the channel e = (u, v) as ζ(u,v) =
b(eu)
c(e) . This is
just the relative amount of funds that the partici-
pant u has in the channel e. Since b(eu) + b(ev)
!
=
c(e) we also have ζ(u,v) + ζ(v,u) = 1. In general, for
an imbalanced chanel we have ζ(u,v) 6= ζ(v,u).
The neighbor function n : V −→ 2E assigns
every node a set of all the channels it is part of.
To make the following formulas easier to read let us
introduce the neighborhood U := n(u).
The total funds of a participant u are denoted
as τu :=
∑
e∈U
b(eu). The value of τu is constant while
no payments are made and no channels are being
opened and closed. In contrast the balance function
2 https://github.com/lightningd/plugins/tree/
master/rebalance
3 https://github.com/bitromortac/lndmanage
4 https://github.com/lightningd/plugins/pull/66
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b can vary subject to re-allocation of funds. The
total capacity of a participant u is denoted as κu :=∑
e∈U
c(e). Using the last two definitions let us define
the node balance coefficient for a participant u as
νu =
τu
κu
.
We call a node u balanced if its channel balance
coefficients ζ(u,v1), . . . , ζ(u,vd) have the same value.
5
This means that the distribution of a node’s rela-
tive funds across all its channels is the same. Con-
sequently, we consider a node unbalanced, if it
local channel balance coefficients are unequal. Sta-
tistically, inequality of a distribution can be mea-
sured with the Gini coefficient. Thus, for a node u
with channel balance coefficients ζ(u,v1), . . . , ζ(u,vd)
we define Gu =
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
|ζi − ζj |
2
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
ζj
If Gu = 0 this
means that the channel balance coefficients are equal.
In contrast, if Gu = 1 the channel balance coeffi-
cients are distributed in the most unequal way.
Note, that the Gini coefficient of a channel bal-
ance coefficients of a node u takes the value 0 if and
only if its channel balance coefficients all take the
same value. This value will be exactly the same as
the node’s balance coefficient νu. Nodes which have
channels with large differences in capacities will not
be able to get a Gini coefficient of 0 if we used ab-
solute balances for the definition of the ζ values as
smaller channels might be drained by larger ones
during rebalancing operations.
Finally, G denotes the imbalance of the network.
G =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
Gv. It is the mean of the imbalance
values of all nodes in the network. A perfectly bal-
anced network would be achieved if G takes the
value of 0 whereas the balance is poor if the value
of G is close to 1.
Our goal is to find a balance function b which
minimizes G given a privacy aware payment channel
network with initial distribution of funds τu1 , . . . , τun .
The constraint to this optimization problem is that
the total funds τu are fixed for every node u ∈ V
and any choice of the balance function b. In a pri-
vacy aware payment channel network the distribu-
tion of funds τu1 . . . , τun is not publicly known.
6 In
the same way the initial balance function is not pub-
licly known. As we lack knowledge about the global
network state, we cannot apply standard optimiza-
tion techniques such as gradient descent, conjugate
5 This value does by no means have to take a value of 0.5
though it certainly seems to be a reasonable goal.
6 Even though the initial distribution could be guessed
from the funding transactions in the case of the
Bitcoin Lightning Network (c.f.: https://github.com/
lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/720) for public
channels it will change with the first payment that is not
a rebalancing operation.
gradient methods or simulated annealing. We sug-
gest to use an heuristic in which every participant
executes some operations to improve its own bal-
ance which others support if it also improves their
balance.
3.1 Description of the rebalancing
algorithm
The developed rebalancing algorithm uses a heuris-
tic in which participants use the local knowledge
and make local adjustments to estimate the opti-
mization problem of finding b such that G is min-
imized. The algorithm therefore is privacy-aware.
It executes as follows:
1. A node u computes its node balance coeffi-
cient νu.
2. u then computes the channel balance coeffi-
cients ζ(u,v1), . . . , ζ(u,vd) for its d channels.
3. The node selects all channels e = (u, vi) for
which its channel balance coefficient is higher
than its node balance coefficient, i.e. C =
{(u, vi)|ζ(u,vi) − νu > 0}7.
4. From the candidate set C a random channel
e = (u, v) is selected.
5. Now the node searches for a circular payment
to itself along e = (u, v) by choosing a path
p = [v, x1, . . . , xn, u]. The amount of that
payment should decrease the value of ζ(u,v)
to that of νu and can be computed as a =
c(e) ·(ζ(u,v)−νu). The end of the circle should
be a channel (xn, u) for which the channel
balance coefficient ζ(u,xn) is smaller than the
node balance coefficient νu.
8
6. The node conducts the payment if all the nodes
on the path p agree to participate. It could
happen that some nodes will only participate
with a value smaller than a. As this is already
progress u will accept the suggested amount
instead of being stubborn.
7. Repeat all steps as long as the local balance
coefficients are not even enough and as long
as paths are found.
When a circular path exists, it is easy to see that
making a payment along this path will make the
distribution of local balance coefficients for node u
7 Note, that we do not need to take absolute values as
u will only be able to initiate a rebalancing operation by
sending money which means decreasing its channel balance
coefficient of ζ(u,vi) towards νu.
8 In one of the experiments we weaken this strong criteria
and show empirically that it makes sense to drop it for the
benefit of easier path finding at the cost of small oscillations
of the algorithm.
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Fig. 1: Probability mass of path-lengths of shortest
paths between all pairs of nodes. As this
is computed on the strongly connected com-
ponent there will always be a path between
each pair of nodes
and those of all participants more even as that was
the condition under which they participated in the
rebalancing operation. If no such circular path can
be found the local balance coefficients and thus the
Network health stays constant.
4 Experimental Setup
We evaluated 4 different strategies for finding re-
balancing cycles. cycles4 tests all cycles of length
4 or smaller. In the same way cycle5 tests all cy-
cles of length 5 or smaller. foaf tests most cycles
of the friend of a friend network.9 mpp is short for
multi-path payments and uses the same heuristic
as foaf but will only take a 20th of the maximum
possible amount for rebalancing operation since it
is supposed to split the rebalancing over various cy-
cles. Our approximation for foaf and mpp explains
why the final results for these two strategies are not
entirely monotonic but oscillating a bit.
We conducted our experiment on a snapshot of
the public Lightning Network from October 2019.
That network view was retrieved from the gossip
store of our lightning node which is accessible at
https://ln.rene-pickhardt.de: As channels are
currently almost always opened by one side10 we
randomly guessed who opened the channel by a coin
flip and allocated the entire channel capacity to that
node. This had to be done as the gossip protocol
does neither propagate any information about who
is opening a channel nor who owns which funds.
After we randomly chose the founder of each
channel we compute the largest strongly connected
9 This approximation is achieved by using cycle4 as a
cycle base as all cycles of length 4 and smaller certainly are
part of the friend of a friend network.
10 Dual funded channels are not part of the protocol and
no implementation is merged to any of the standard nodes
Fig. 2: The histogram shows the distribution of rel-
ative funds ν for all nodes of the network.
component to remove nodes which had the funds
allocated in a way that would not allow any re-
balancing. The strongly connected component con-
sists of 2707 nodes and 24161 edges. The diameter
of the strongly connected component had a value
of 10 and the cumulative distance distribution of
shortest paths between all pairs can be seen in Fig-
ure 1. Note that the notion of shortest paths with
respect to fees depends on the amount that is being
transferred as the fees on channels have a fixed base
fee and a variable fee rate. For the computation of
shortest paths we have assumed a fixed payment
size and, essentially, computed the shortest paths
by only respecting the fixed base fee. Shortest paths
correspond to the cheapest paths.
Note that almost 40% of shortest paths are longer
than the cycles that our strategies have tested. This
demonstrates that the single rebalancing operations
which we conducted were not covering the entire
network but only taking place within local parts of
the network. This is particularly true for the rebal-
ancing in the friend of a friend network.
From Figure 2 we can see the result of our ran-
dom process of allocating funds to the nodes and
selecting the largest strongly connected component.
It is plausible that ν = 0.5 is the mode of the his-
togram as the coin flip will statistically lead to as
many channels with inbound capacity as channels
with outbound capacity.
Figure 3 depicts the initial distribution of Gini
coefficients for each node of the examined network.
This plot also reflects the random nature of the al-
located funds already resulting in an average value
as the total network imbalance very close to 0.5.
In order to conduct the experiments we simu-
lated the proposed algorithm and strategies in the
following way. For each channel we computed up to
5000 rebalancing cycles following the defined strat-
egy. The number 5000 was chosen to be as large as
possible so that we were able to conduct the sim-
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Fig. 3: The distribution of Gini coefficients for each
node over its distribution of channel balance
coefficients ζ of the input network before any
rebalancing experiment was taking place.
Fig. 4: Comparing how the imbalance score of the
network behaves with the amount of success-
full rebalancing operations. As the rebal-
ancing amounts are much smaller with multi
path payments the x-axis has a logarithmic
scale.
ulation within the 16 GB of main memory of our
machine. In most cases there were less than 5000
cycles available. However sometimes we had to cut
off the precomputed cycles as the hard cap of 5000
was hit.
For each cycle we checked if a rebalancing was
possible without having nodes on the path wors-
ening their channel balance coefficients. As this
assumption is very strong the vast majority in re-
balancing attempts along a cycle would fail or only
work with an amount smaller than the one proposed
by the initiator.
5 Results
Figure 4 confirms that the imbalance of the net-
work is decreasing over time when running our sim-
Fig. 5: Every time the imbalance score reached a
new low to a two digit decimal we computed
the probability for a random payment of the
smallest possible amount to succeed on the
cheapest path.
ulation. This means that the network is becoming
more balanced. We see that most improvement is
happening quite fast with 10k to 100k rebalancing
operations being necessary. This is not more than
37 rebalancing operations per node. Taking into ac-
count that the average node degree is 9 this means
that on average each node needs to successfully ex-
ecute about 4 rebalancing operations per channel.
This seams plausible in the sense that every channel
gets rebalanced at least once.11 The multi-path re-
balancing needs more operations which makes sense
as we only rebalanced for a 20th of the possible
amount in the multi-path case since we wanted to
have multiple other cycles to rebalance that partic-
ular channel. While cycle4 seems to improve the
balance more quickly it does not reach the minimum
imbalance as well as the other strategies. In partic-
ular the algorithm converges to a local minimum
rather quickly. Our experimental runs resulted in
states that are not identical when we shuffled the
order of cycles that we probed, however, the dif-
ferences were negligible. We guess that the local
minimum might be close to global minimum of the
optimization problem.
In Figure 5 we see that a lower imbalance score
G yields a higher success rate of payments as one
would expect. The success rate is measured by at-
tempting a payment of 1 Satoshi between all pairs
of nodes and counting the relative amount of pay-
ment attempts for which the cheapest path from
the source to the destination was successful. We
computed the success rate of every time the balance
score hits a new score rounded to two decimals. It is
11 Note, that due to the collaborative behaviour of nodes a
node might also get its channels rebalanced in the rebalanc-
ing attempts of other nodes.
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Fig. 6: The imbalance of the network is plotted
against the median value of payments that
can be fulfilled between all pairs of nodes on
the first attempt along the cheapest path.
Note that failed payments are part of the
statistics and counted as payments which
can send 0 Satoshi.
the first experiment that indicates that the defined
imbalance score was well chosen. Again the multi-
path payment strategy sticks out as it achieves a
rather high success rate while the network is still
rather imbalanced. A success rate of 80% is reached
for an imbalance score of 0.43. Comparing this
to Figure 4 we see that about 250k rebalance op-
erations are necessary to achieve this success rate.
Even the worst performing algorithm achieves this
success rate with far less than 100k rebalancing op-
erations and a much better overall imbalance score.
This effect - while expected as multi-path rebal-
ancing uses smaller amounts - becomes more visible
in the next experiment. As 1 Satoshi payments are
not too useful in a real world setting we checked if
the overall amounts that can be routed increase in
a better balanced network.
In Figure 6 we compare the imbalance of the
network with the median possible payment amount
which is computed as follows: For all pairs of short-
est paths on the base fee graph we look at the
amount that could be forwarded along that path.
Finally we take the median of those values. This
means that at least 50% of payment pairs are able
to forward this amount. Again we see that the lower
the imbalance score becomes the higher the median
possible payment size gets. This suggests that sta-
tistically a more balanced network is able to suc-
cessfully route higher payment amounts on the first
try. All four strategies are achieving a median possi-
ble payment amount of roughly 50000 Satoshi. This
means that in a balanced network 50% of payment
pairs are able to successfully conduct a payment of
0.5 mBTC along the cheapest path. The result also
indicates that the strategy for probing rebalancing
Fig. 7: The maximal payable amounts on all pairs
of cheapest paths on the initial imbalanced
network and on the network after applying
the friend of a friend rebalancing strategy.
Fig. 8: The distribution of Gini coefficients for each
node over its distribution of channel balance
coefficients ζ of the network after applying
the foaf rebalancing strategy.
cycles seems to have little to no impact to the final
abilities of the network to perform payments.
We look a little bit closer at the data point of the
most balanced network with the friend of a friend
strategy and compare it to the imbalanced network.
Instead of just looking at the median we study the
cumulative distribution function of the histogram
in Figure 7. We can see that in the imbalanced
network almost 88.8% of the paths are not able to
forward a single Satoshi (meaning a 11.2% success
rate). This number drops below 1.7% (meaning a
98.3% success rate) for the balanced network.
For the friend of a friend network we have also
plotted the final distribution of Gini coefficients in Fig-
ure 8.
For a better comparison with Figure 3 we pro-
vide the cumulative distribution function of both
distributions with a smaller bin size in Figure 9.
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Fig. 9: Comparing the distribution of the node’s
Gini coefficients before and after rebalanc-
ing with the friend of a friend strategy.
Fig. 10: Total fees earned by nodes during all rebal-
ancing operations. Negative fees mean that
the node paid more fees than it earned.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff distance takes a value
of 0.74. This verifies the statistical significance of
the rebalancing heuristic in comparison to staying
with the imbalanced network. The median value of
the Gini coefficients in the best balanced network
we could acquire is about 0.15. In comparison on
the imbalanced network the median Gini coefficient
takes the value of 0.5.
Finally, we tracked the routing fees that nodes
would have to pay for their rebalancing operations
and that they would earn while participating in the
rebalancing operation of others.
Figure 10 shows that the overall fees are nor-
mally distributed around 0. This means that the
expected value of fees that need to be paid or are
being earned if all nodes participate in proactive re-
balancing is 0. An expected value of 0 is a strong
indicator that fees should not play a role for rebal-
ancing operations if those are beneficial for all nodes
that are asked to take part in the rebalancing op-
eration. We zoomed heavily in so that only 50% of
the nodes have been depicted in this view due to
the large variance of this distribution.
6 Discussion
We empirically verified that the overall ability of
the network participants to route payments on ran-
dom paths is improved a lot in a balanced network.
As privacy aware payment channel networks use
source-based path finding without knowing the con-
straints of the channels along an attempted path,
the likelihood of conducting a successful payment
with few attempts becomes considerably higher in
a balanced network. Our results show that nodes
do not need to strive for νu = 0.5 and perfect local
balance of their channels in order to produce high
success rate of random payments. It is sufficient
for the overall network to be balanced if every node
tries to optimize their channel balance coefficients
be almost equal. This can be achieved by making
circular rebalancing payments.
We have proposed a greedy rebalancing heuris-
tic which we have tested with 4 different strategies
to select rebalancing cycles. We could see that the
results of these four strategies do not significantly
differ for the overall performance of the network.
While multi-path rebalancing achieves the actual
best values on both success rates and median pay-
ment size the lead is negligible and stands in no
ratio to the extra amount of rebalancing operations
that need to take place.
Computing the rebalancing cycles is the most
expensive operation in our simulation since we had
to do it for every node of the network. If the greedy
heuristic is implemented in a real payment chan-
nel network this is not too expensive for a single
node. This holds in particular true if those cycles
will only be searched within the friend of a friend
network which is typically small enough. As the
results of the different strategies for finding cycles
did not vary and for the previous reason we pro-
pose to stick to rebalancing in the friend of a friend
network. In a real payment channel network this
computation would only have to be conducted if the
distribution of channel balance coefficients becomes
too uneven, which is easily monitored after every
payment or routing attempt without additional per-
formance overhead.
Finally, we empirically showed that the earned
and paid fees for rebalancing operations are nor-
mally distributed around 0 Satoshi suggesting that
this is a zero sum game if every node participates
in proactive rebalancing. Routing fees might dis-
courage nodes from proactively rebalancing as they
might hope to earn fees if they wait for others to
rebalance their channels. This behaviour is referred
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to as the tragedy of the commons12 and would be
mitigated with a fee free rebalancing protocol. As
fees are empirically a zero sum game and to incen-
tivize the participation of the rebalancing it seems
reasonable to omit fees for rebalancing operations
if those are beneficial for every participant as in the
experiment.13
In a similar way as Internet routers collabora-
tively solve the path finding problem by exchang-
ing routing tables, we furthermore suggest for the
network to work collaboratively towards achieving
a good balance by locally sharing rebalancing hints.
As balances of channels in the friend of a friend net-
work can easily be probed, it seems plausible in pri-
vacy aware payment channel networks to include a
communication protocol with which a node signals
to their partners that it wants to rebalance a certain
channel with a certain amount. Instead of a certain
amount a node could just signal if it needs inbound
or outbound liquidity on a channel. We think that
our suggestion for sharing channels that need a re-
balancing operation does not reveal more informa-
tion as can currently be collected with probing at-
tacks. However, sharing rebalancing hints gives out
perfect information to compute available rebalanc-
ing cycles.
The rebalancing is particularly important as pri-
vacy aware payment channel networks use source
based onion routing and technically have to guess
a path for making a payment. When those initially
guessed paths provide a high success rate with high
payment amounts there are considerable benefits for
the overall functioning of the payment channel net-
work. The user experience is improved, the pay-
ment delays are lowered, and the amount of mes-
saging and coordination is minimised.
7 Future Work
As the simulation was already consuming a lot of
computational resources we did not check if the
algorithm greedy heuristic is stable under concur-
rent payments and rebalancing operations taking
place. In a similar gist simulations on larger net-
works would be interesting but require more signif-
icant computational resources and time to be con-
ducted.
The current experiments have assumed a stable
network topology. However, every channel open-
ing or closure, as well as every single payment, will
change the imbalance of the network. It is there-
fore necessary to study how it adapts if the topol-
ogy changes in real time due to opening or closing
12 c.f. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_
commons
13 This would of course need a protocol change in the light-
ning network protocol as the current onion routing could not
guarantee to the routing noes that they process a fee free re-
balancing payment.
channels as well as a reallocation of funds due to
payments that are taking place. It would be in par-
ticular interesting to see how this heuristic works in
combination with JIT-Routing as this would unbal-
ance nodes to provide liquidity which our heuristic
would then redistribute over the friend of a friend
network. This would occur along all nodes on a path
in intersecting friend of a friend networks. It would
be interesting to see how this algorithm behaves to-
gether with Atomic Multipath Payments which are
in the style of [1] redundant but along our results
carry at most 50000 Satoshi.
Another extension of the work is to check how
the heuristic performs if only a fraction of nodes
participate in the sharing of rebalancing hints and
fee free rebalancing protocol.
Current implementations of the Lightning Net-
work provide autopilots to the users which help the
users to automatically open channels. The results
from this research should be used in those autopi-
lots and an investigation how exactly this might be
useful would be of high interest.
The balance metric used could be used as a mea-
sure of network health in the context of random
path payments. However, random path payments
are only one of the possible scenarios of payments
flowing in a payment network. Thus, a natural ex-
tension of this work is to study the relationship
between the proposed balance and network health.
Can nodes define their local health in various ways
and what would happen with the greedy algorithm
if different health definitions are followed by indi-
vidual nodes? For example routing nodes or liq-
uidity providers might very well want to have high
values of ζ on some of their channels where as they
might be willing to accept low values for ζ on other
channels. In a similar way merchants will proba-
bly prefer many channels with low values of ζ. The
proposed algorithm could potentially be exchanged
to an updated version in which nodes decide their
own health metric, instead of using balance as the
measure of network health.
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